Holsti declares that our understanding of these "third kind" types of conflicts are "not well served by older analytical approaches," (p. xi) because from the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 to the Cold War war has been defined as a contest between sovereign states. Even the United Nations was crea ted to provide interna tional peac e and secu rity between states not within them. (p. 5) From a theoretical standpoint Holsti, mimicking Martin van Creveld's argument first put forward in 1991,4 notes that the Clausewitzian concept of war as a means of serving state interests continues to form the intellectual and conceptual foundation for international organizations, national military institutions, and the practice of diplomacy, and is the wrong way to look at modern war. Actually, as John Keegan has noted, we have missed the full nuance of Clausewitz's famous politico-military dictum. In proper translation war is the continuation "of political intercourse" (des politischen Verkehrs) "with the intermixing of other means" (mit Einmischung anderer Mittel).5 Nevertheless, Clausewitz conceived political and military problems in terms of states and we continue to do so.
The solutions to war coming out of the realism of Rousseau and the liberalism of Woodrow Wilson were disarmament, judicial settlements, democratization of states, peace education, international organizations and world federalism, all state-centered initiatives. In fact, only Lenin proscribed a solution, world revolution, that was not state centered. (p. 11) Holsti believes our view is too Eurocentric, and the relevance to post-1945 wars of such terms as "balances of power", "alliances", "hegemony", "deterrence", and "power projection," are highly problematic. (p. 14) Ultimately, he feels that in the post-1945 world "the assumption that the problem of war is primarily a problem of the relations between states has to be seriously questioned." (p. 15)
In examining "wars of the third kind" since 1945 Holsti advocates a study of state creation, state morphology and even pathology of weak states. His definition of the "strength of states" is important. Strength should not be measured in military terms, but rather in the capacity of the state to command loyalty -the right to rule -to extract the resources necessary to rule and provide services, to maintain that essential element of sovereignty, a monopoly over the legitimate use of force within defined territorial limits, and to operate within the context of a consensus-based political community. (p. 83)
The essential problem then is "legitimacy," which manifests itself through three competing principles: "popular sovereignty," "religion," and "natural community," i.e. "ethnicity." The last two are exclusive, and the "contradiction between exclusive principles of legitimacy and the demographic and social constitution of most post-colonial and post-Soviet societies creates weak states and, ultimately war." (p. xii) Holsti explores the idea of "legitimacy" further by differentiating between "horizontal" and "vertical" legitimacy. The former is "the attitudes and practices of individuals and groups within the state toward each other and ultimately to the state that encompasses them." (p. 87) This is an interesting concept in that in strong states this means that no group is excluded from seeking political power and enjoying its benefits. (p. 93) Such a definition begs the question of how one rates the strength and legitimacy of the United States where there has been only one catholic president and power is overwhelmingly concentrated in the hands of white males. Is the US therefore a weak state because of such discrepancies? "Vertical" legitimacy reflects the established right to rule between society and political institutions and regimes. (p. 97) Neither level of legitimacy existed in most new states created after 1945.
Holsti expands his analysis from single states to groups of weak or strong states for the broader implications of such an approach. His analysis, not surprisingly, reveals that "zones" of weak states are "zones of war" (p. 141) and zones of strong states are zones of peace. Yet his analysis at this point lacks the sophistication of that put forward by John Keegan and Andrew Wheatcroft in Zones of Conflict: An Atlas of Future Wars (1986), a geographical study with factors of climate, logistics, economic, military power and political discontent superimposed. Keegan and Wheatcroft conclude that there is a very constricted area of the world where successful conventional warfare can be carried out and that, "It is where real assets, political instability, and the lack of secure borders meet that trouble, present and future, will occur and recur."6 Holsti would say of this approach that it is too state-centered and driven by an improper focus on "national interest."
In explaining why zones of strong states, such as western Europe, equals less war Holsti identifies a number of factors: economic interdependence, respect for international law, mutual empathy and others, but reasons that additional "factors that are difficult to quantify" are important as well. For example, he feels that the self-perception of democratic-liberal states as upholders of democracy, decency and international law work collectively to reduce the frequency of conflict. (p. 146) This may be part of it, but surely the membership of most of the countries in NATO must be the decisive factor because little would be gained, or allowed to be gained, from military confrontation between the member nations.
In concluding his study, Holsti offered the theoretical proposition that "in the years to come it is not so much the state of the international system that matters -as traditional approaches to international politics and war would have it -but rather the state of the state. (p. 209) What Holsti does not do is suggest what will happen once such "wars of the third kind" have been settled. What for example, will happen when the Balkans finally become stabilized along territorial lines with each interest group recognized by the international community as separate entities? Most assuredly, we will return to "inter-state" conflict there.
In Why Wars Happen, Jeremy Black, professor of History at Exeter University, argues that to approach the question of why wars happens from an overwhelming emphasis on twentiethcentury, and even nineteenth-century conflicts, "limits the basis for theoretical and general reflections" and truncates the search for continuities and changes from th e past. (p. 10) In stressing a chronological approach and striving to incorporate lessons from outside Europe to challenge Eurocentric perspectives he attempts to achieve a broad historical perspective and context. (p. 10) Thus the work is divided into different "ages," from 1450 to the present with chapter titles like "An Age of Limited War," "Wars of Revolution and Nationalism," "Wars of Imperialism," "Total War," and "Cold War and the Wars of Decolonization."
Black represents the interests of the skilled historian who relies more on the surviving documentary evidence than the models of political scientists to explain state policy.
Fundamental to his work is an intimate study of cultural and social factors and their relationship to the origins of war. Specifically, he emphasizes the role of cultural predispositions and focuses on "bellicosity" in different societies. He also recognizes that the difficulty in defining war creates problems in using statistical studies of its origins. (p. 16) For example, there is a crucial distinction between "hostility" and war because "Hostile interests, whether economic, political, religious or ideological, do not have to lead to war." (p. 23) Black believes that the "transformation of disputes into crises, and of crises into war . . . depends not so much on the dispute in question as on how it is perceived. In short, bellicosity creates the severity of a crisis and often ensures how it is handled." (p. 34) Bellicosity does not require militarism in state and society, but it is greatly helped by the strength of militarist ideas and institutions. (p. 240) Black attempts to go beyond the standard method of identifying the crucial issue to recognize "triggers" and "precipitants," "but to do so within a context that notes the degree to which such triggers are best discussed in terms of a cultural world that focuses on conflict -in other words, bellicosity." (p. 19) Though a reliance on bellicosity lies at the heart of Black's analysis he readily addresses its weakness as a conceptual framework. Indeed, he is fully convinced that "Bellicosity and other domestic factors ensure that relationships between ends and means cannot be comprehensively calculated." (p. 22) Moreover, its multiple nature, being an emotion, an approach to reasoning, and an action (violence), not only makes for ambiguity, but also ensures that the problem of evidence is particularly acute. (p. 35) Additionally, he concedes that there is no easy measure of bellicosity. "To assess it by counting the frequency and, in some way, measuring the intensity of warfare," he states, "is only of limited value, most clearly because it does not consider bellicosity that does not lead to war." (p. 41)
In fact, Black struggles with general propensities to violence as a cause of war. He would probably accept some of Barbara Ehrenreichs conclusions, forwarded in Blood Rites: Origins and History of the Passions of War (1997) , that ancient blood rites are the origin of aggressive propensities.7 Black does admit that a willingness to kill is indeed crucial to the causes of war (p. 14) and war helps explain society in an important dimension of its activity. In fact, he utilizes terms such as "warfare societies" and "warfulness," and the "willingness to fight" to explain his view. "Willingness to fight," for example, is brought into focus by comparing the aggressiveness in international relations of Ronald Reagan and Jimmy Carter. (p. 22) Ultimately, Black concludes, "War has to be understood in terms of ideologies, elite roles, government and social purposes, sports and games." (p. 32) Societal change is important, especially when it is reviewed over the 500 years of the work because such change has affected bellicosity.
Despite the weaknesses of the approach, Black finds bellicosity useful for several reasons. For one, it is important "not only to creating a general context for international relations but also in sustaining the view that war is an instrument of policy, and in determining how disputes between, and within, states were treated." (p. 239) Thus Black relies more on the Clausewitzian approach than Holsti. Bellicosity leads to war not through misunderstandings that produce inaccurate calculations of interest and response, but rather from an acceptance of different interests and a conviction that they can be best resolved through the use of force. This enhances our understanding of "intentionality." Moreover, bellicosity also helps explain the continuation of wars once begun. However, the concepts greatest contribution is that, in part, it helps "overcome the unhelpful distinction between rationality and irrationality in motivation and conduct." While cultural factors act as an enabling force in allowing wars to happen, they do not cause them and that, instead, "politicians have to want to go to war for some perceived benefit to the state." (p. Black's discussion of "national interest" is interesting. The "rationalist" calculation of national interests is "overly limited" because it "underplays domestic pressures for war." (p. 31) This is diametrically opposed to Brian Bonds recent thesis in The Pursuit of Victory: From Napoleon to Saddam Hussein (1996) that wars are still fought for national interest. Those who start wars clearly think there is something to gain and warns that wars as an instrument of policy are not yet passéé citing the Falklands and the Gulf War as examples.10 Indeed, lending further weight to the rational calculation thesis, Henry Kissinger recently asserted that no country in the twentieth century has been "more pragmatic in the day-to-day conduct of its diplomacy" than the United States.11 Black concludes his study by examining the state of war from 1990 to the present and perceives changed international attitudes that have generated less bellicosity. In the case of the United States, he cites the influence of the Weinberger doctrine of the mid-1980s, which advanced six principles for choosing the option to go to war: just cause, determination to win, right intention, proportionality, popular support and last resort. Such attitudes are also reflected in American military doctrine that has recently stressed Operations Other Than War (OOTW), and includes two specific principles, "legitimacy" and "perseverance," designed to focus American efforts.12 Black suggests quite rightly, that such attitudes do not exist in control societies like Iraq, Syria, China or Indonesia. (p. 217) His assessment of the West is that it has lost the warrior mentality. Veterans are less influential and TV "does influence patterns of causation and continuance, especially by constraining democratic governments from pursuing campaigns abroad." He refers to the 1968 Viet Cong Tet offensive as illustrative of this point, but other television "snapshots" have also proved decisive in driving policy, such as the destruction on the Basra Road and the dragging of the bodies of US Army Rangers through the streets of Mogadishu. (p. 223) Anti-war attitudes dominate today; war is seen as an aberration when it occurs and capitalism needs peace. (p. 226) He makes the point that when domestic pressures are expressed in terms of demands for more schools then this both detracts from any emphasis on confrontation in international relations and creates a domestic political sphere in which force is not central. 
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